Are We Meat Machines? Artificial Intelligence and Groupanalysis

The purpose of this paper is to raise some fundamental questions for debate and reflection on the topic of technologies and Groupanalysis. What can it mean for analytic theory to be confronted with a model of mind as a “meat machine”, an epistemological paradigm whose model of the mind increasingly comes from neuroscience, computer science, logic, mathematics, and physics, that increasingly explains mental processes through an equivalence between neurons and propositions (binary digital system, NO /OFF (0;1)) and between neural networks and algorithms? How can analytic theory and technique, rooted in drive, desire, and the unconscious, be reconciled with this model, which seems to be characterized by a dematerialization of the organic, the body, and culture? What implications and/or changes might object relations theory have to help 21st century patients whose internal relational matrix can integrate virtual transitional and relational objects? And how might real therapists deal with the profound changes that will result from the recognition of relational dynamics such as infatuation, camaraderie, or rivalry with “possibly infinitely intelligent artificial beings” (AI), as well as the possible emergence of a virtual analyst?

The relevance of the subject

Artificial intelligence is a branch of computer science that deals with computer language (algorithms) and studies how computers can mimic human thought. It includes areas such as decision-making and predictive capabilities and visualization of situations. The main problems of artificial intelligence include programming computers for areas such as: knowledge, reasoning, problem solving, perception, learning, planning, and the ability to manipulate and move objects. (Gardner, 2002).

In the last 25 years, the progress of artificial intelligence has reached colossal proportions. There is an urgent need for a community-wide debate, and governments, still only peripherally aware of what this revolution means, must ensure legislation that serves the collective benefit of an AI-driven digital socio-economy. Personal and collective behaviors are also more and more AI -driven, and the impact of this digitalization of human existence is unknown.

Artificial intelligence already dominates our lives, especially when we are online. Algorithms can already calculate what we should know, who we should communicate with, what we want to buy, or whether we are worth saving by medicine. The advertising we are presented with online is filtered through algorithmic formulas based on the profile of our past behavior.

This fact has prompted world-renowned figures such as Bill Gates, Elon Musk, and Stephen Hawking, and many others, to express concern about the potentially dangerous effects and unintended consequences of artificial intelligence on human civilization.

The cognitive revolution: from the black box to the “meat machine”

In the era of behaviorism, which ushered in the decline of psychoanalysis, any reference to internal states was strictly forbidden, as if the mind were a black box that should not be opened. The revolution in cognitive science, however, made it possible to describe the formal laws of thought captured by propositional logic and made systematic information processing possible. The development of cognitive science made possible to overcome the behaviorist concept of the black box. Inner states are no longer inaccessible, and the inner content of think processes were no longer unscientific. Technologies have brought cognitive science into the human world and vice versa: the computer and science support evidence for the existence of unobservable internal states – linguistic structures – that generate content. Ironically computers made possible to empirically prove the existence of internal states and systems (Tuckle, 1988). Oddly enough, it was the embarrassment of behaviorists in the face of evidence that computers have internal states that lifted the ban on science studying the internal states of humans. They allowed to open the black box of the mind and understand how people store, manage, and transform information into symbols/words.

The effective results of the cognitive research began the late 50´s of the XX century (Gardner, 2002) strongly helped by the assumption of the research for AI: that computers might be able to think like us, given human intelligence. Alan Turing´s attempts to decode messages generated by the German machine ENIGMA that, if deciphered, would provide access to information that could be used to predict attacks by Hitler’s troops, allow to develop the first computer. In 1950 he wrote “Computing Machinery and intelligence” conceiving the concept of an imitation game that suggests an equivalence of minds to machines. He develops a standard test, known as the Turing Test, to answer the question, “Can machines think?” claiming that if a computer’s answers cannot be distinguished from those of a human, it is “intelligent”. The AI thesis that the essence of mental life is a set of principles that can be shared by humans and machines (Turkle, 1988) brings the mind closer to a program. Computer and cognitive scientists are converging in the terms they use to describe internal agents, pushing science to create a machine mind, which raises important questions about the autonomy of the self (or free will), subjectivity, and intentionality.

This is an epistemological profound change in our paradigm of mind. In the next example we can see it clearly. Sherry Turkle, a professor at the Institute for Social Studies (MIT), conducts research on psychoanalysis and human-technical interaction. In the article “Whither Psychoanalysis in Computer Culture?” (2004) she describes a course in which she taught computer science students the concepts of ambivalence and the Freudian unconscious using Freud’s text “Some elementary lessons of psychoanalysis” (1940) as in the case:

“The president of a public body (the lower house of the Austrian parliament) once opened a meeting with the following words: ‘I note that there is a quorum and therefore declare the meeting closed. ` This was a verbal slip, because there is no doubt that the President meant to say ‘open’.

One of the students at the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory founded by Marvin Minsky who claimed that the mind is a‘meat machine’ and made an analogy between the mind and a computer program, raised a question about the omissions. In this student’s view, this is a false question because the explanation for this event does not require the notion of conflict (ambivalence). It would only need the notion of an open or closed door for the output (answer) to come out. What would have happened would not have been the product of a conflict due to a desire, but an error in information processing simply because the wrong exit door was open.

Algorithms turn into all mighty power because they opened information about pathways to decision (Domingos, 2017). With the advent of machine learning, the programs can program themselves, by creating new algorithms without human awareness.  In the age of megadata (BIGDATA), AI has never been so close to replacing humans. But this revolution raises many questions. One of the most relevant points is the phenomenon of the black box, that is, the fact that we do not know precisely what are the rules that govern the mind and make decisions for us.

Is the mind a simulation?

This problem is, in our view, well elaborated by Antonio Damasio (1995) when he argues that the separation of mind and body (Descartes’ fallacy) is one of the most damaging fallacies for understanding what we are in the history of thought. For Damasio, mental phenomena originate in biological processes of the brain, and it is only because there is a living body that the aspects of the mind with feelings, self-consciousness, and will exist.

A mind is authentic only if it has an internal knowing entity (an “I” as “knower”) that is responsible for the existence of a unique property of the human mind: subjectivity. This is a familiar argument from philosophy of mind, which tries to show us that there is a very important difference between representation and meaning that presupposes intentionality and consciousness. In a 1980 article entitled “Minds, Brains and Programs,” John Searle constructs the Chinese Room argument to show that the implementation of a computer program alone is not sufficient to produce real mental states in computers. In this sense, if the President’s lapse were an error in information processing, there would be no self with desires and intentions, because the mind would function under the same conditions as an information processing program with right or wrong outputs. Searle thus combats the central thesis of the Strong Artificial Intelligence project: that a properly programmed computer has genuine conscious states.

Still in search for the black box: subjective experience and unconscious

The history of psychoanalytic and group analysis thought is rich with authors who take us in a different direction: subjective experiences, affect and human relations.

Freud had many difficulties explaining his own conclusions without postulating the need for a subjective origin of psychopathology. The inner experiences and the inner object are first outlined in a footnote in the “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” (1905), that the child misses the mother, and the anxiety arising from this missing is due to the “absence of a beloved person”. In “Inhibition, Symptom, and Anxiety” (1936), Freud outlines for the first time that the anxiety of helplessness is a fundamental and relational anxiety. Also, in the conceptualization of the superego, “something brought from the external environment by an attachment and with which the subject begins to relate from within” and in “Grief and Melancholy,” (1917) in which an inner object-the shadow of the object “affects the subject from within” Freud sows the idea that there are inner objects (subjective world) and relational aspects, but without developing this line of thought, since these ideas might endanger the theoretical system, which is based on the concepts of drive, defense and structure.

Melanie Klein (1948) went further in conceptualizing a subjective world and the importance of the object relation for psychic life, as she pioneered the study of motherhood (breast). For Klein, the satisfaction of a drive is not a mere drive discharge; she postulated the existence of an unconscious fantasy (Klein, 1948) that moves toward the object from the beginning of mental life (intentionality of the mind). The idea that there is a mental space – subjectivity – and that imagination is the very substance of mental life would occupy a central place in Klein.

For Fairbairn (1952), too, the fundamental motivation of human beings is the need to seek connections with others. Each individual shapes his mind according to the internalized patterns of his important relationships. In this sense, Fairbairn also postulates a subjectivity that ensures the existence of an inner world, focusing on interactions with real subjects and the real world.

Winnicott (1952/1955) conceives of the psyche not as a preexistent structure but as something constituted by the imaginative elaboration of the body and its functions, representing psyche-soma integration. The concept of a sufficiently good mother is central because the baby and its mother are, at the beginning, a psychic unity of two indeterminate beings. The baby’s psychic development then depends on the possibility of the mother performing the original functions well enough, because she primarily takes care of the baby, comforts, supports and attunes to him, holds him (enables integration in time and space) and shows him how and what objects she presents (enables contact with reality).

For Bion (1962a) the ability to receive a new and unfamiliar content depends initially on the experience of containment, which is initially fostered by something outside the baby – the mother. Thus, raw matter or beta elements – pure emotions such as hunger (the most primitive) – are returned to creative matter or alpha elements, as is the way in which these elements are produced/transformed – the alpha function. The introduction of the alpha function enables the baby to develop its own ability to translate and metabolize its beta elements without expelling them (unmetabolized expelled elements).

Finally, considering the group analytic approach, the experience of the unconscious, human relations, and subjectivity is the core for modelling the mind. The difference with Foulkes in conceptualizing group analysis is the insight into the pernicious human obsession with the identity of the self (Ferreira, 1988). Foulkes (1964) enthusiastically holds to the idea that the origin of many psychological pathologies lies in man’s insistence on a solipsistic ego, as opposed to what is offered to man as natural: the birth of the individual in the group. Since Foulkes saw the group as fundamental to human existence, since all individuals emerge from social groups (family, culture, society), he considered it a milieu with rich therapeutic potential. The group analytic theory he developed highlighted its potential in terms of relational constellation, communication network, influencing at conscious and unconscious levels, facilitating mirror phenomena, possibility of promoting the individual’s mobility, and ability to help oneself. Foulkes owes the development of Group analysis as a differentiated scientific and therapeutic field (theoretical and technical), with its own concepts derived from specific factors of the group (mirroring, communication, matrix, ego training in action, resonance, polarization, scapegoat), where the notion of a transformation of an “unconscious phantasmatic resonance” (Melo, 2004).  goes beyond symptomatic relief, towards a more lasting change in personality.

These several examples illustrate that the paradigm of mind in analytic therapies is incompatible with the concept of a meat machine. Psychoanalytic and group analytic theory, as realized a long time ago, states that subjectivity, raised of a living body, is not compatible with abstraction. AI, or artificial intelligence, can perform intelligent rationales but lacks subjective experiences and personal consciousness, which are fundamental aspects of emotions.

Questions and reflections about AI and the impact on Groupanalysis  

The emergence of a postmodern model of mind as machine and machine with mind, in which the measure of transformation is information, is becoming increasingly extensive. The question about the absence of emotions and the subjectivity of AI is rapidly being addressed. Researchers have explored ways to incorporate emotional intelligence into AI systems to enhance their interactions with humans. This involves the development of algorithms and techniques that enable AI to understand, interpret, and respond to human emotions. Applications include sentiment analysis, affective computing, and emotionally intelligent agents. Sentiment analysis is the process of determining the emotional tone or sentiment expressed in a text. Affective computing aims to develop systems that can recognize and respond to human emotions through various modalities, including facial expressions, vocal intonations, and physiological signals, such as heart rate and skin conductance. These agents can recognize and respond to human emotions, adapt their behavior accordingly, and establish a sense of rapport with users. While AI systems can simulate emotional responses, it is important to understand that these responses are based on programmed rules and algorithms rather than genuine emotions.

However, I believe that towards a model of the mind that pursues devitalization (dematerialization), replacing it to simulate the possibility of expanding a mixture of reality and fantasy, accelerated time, distorted space, expansion, and contraction or multiplication of selves is strong.

Sherry Turkel’s reflection on the human-machine interface in her 1984 piece “The Second Self” can help to understand what kind of phenomena can occur. In the author’s opinion, most computer-related considerations are instrumental. However, human-computer interaction may portend significant alterations in psychology, personality, and culture. The author urges us to consider the “subjective computer,” or the ways in which it influences our thoughts, particularly how we view ourselves and how it enters social life and psychological growth.

From this author’s viewpoint, it is possible to identify the traits of artificially intelligent objects.

– They are evocative objects, which provoke contemplation by fascinating the subject and may cause losing of control

– They are projective objects with the capacity to create an almost limitless number of different selves because when a person interacts with an object, such as by programming it, the object takes on the characteristics of the person who interacts with it.

– Challenge-limiting concepts such as animate/inanimate, conscious/non-conscious, intimate/non-intimate, outside/inside, subjective/objective, and normal/deviant in new ways that are likely to change the way we think about them, in the development of personality, identity, and possibly even sexuality. Consequently, they are “metaphysical” and “psychological” objects.

It also seems plausible to advance the notion that computational objects can occasionally act as anti-transitional objects because they can obstruct the phenomenon of progressive separation and the development of the capacity to be alone in a healthy manner. Additionally, computational objects challenge some limiting concepts by encouraging dual-state phenomena, such as to be and not to be, to be separate and to be together, to be and not to be.

The dog’s or child’s blanket is already being replaced with iPads. Additionally, I want to underline how perfect borderline items are for such an uncertain moment computational object.

Additionally, there are several ways in which AI can contribute to group analysis:

1. Data Analysis and Insights: AI algorithms can analyze large amounts of data collected from group therapy sessions, including verbal interactions, facial expressions, and sentiment analysis. This analysis can help therapists gain insight into group dynamics, identify patterns, and make informed decisions regarding treatment plans.
2. Supportive Chatbots: AI-powered chatbots can assist group therapy participants by providing emotional support, answering common questions, and by offering coping strategies. These chatbots are available 24/7, ensuring that individuals have access to support whenever they need it.
3. Personalized Recommendations: AI algorithms can analyze individual therapy session data and provide personalized recommendations to participants based on their specific needs. These recommendations included relevant resources, exercises, or self-help materials.
4. Virtual Group Therapy: AI can facilitate virtual group therapy sessions by providing video-conferencing platforms, managing scheduling, and maintaining privacy and security. AI can also assist in moderating the discussion, ensuring that everyone has a chance to participate and guide the conversation based on therapeutic goals.
5. Sentiment Analysis: AI can analyze participants’ language, tone, and sentiment during group therapy sessions, providing real-time feedback to the therapist. This information can help therapists gauge the emotional state of a group, identify potential conflicts, and address them appropriately.
6. Language Translation: AI-powered translation tools can be beneficial in multicultural group therapy settings, in which participants speak different languages. These tools can help bridge language barriers and allow participants to communicate and understand each other effectively.
7. Reminders and Follow-ups: AI can send automated reminders and follow-up messages to group therapy participants, ensuring that they remain engaged and committed to the therapy process. These reminders can include session schedules, homework assignments, and resources shared during sessions.

I believe it is important to raise some questions even if we are not meat machines because, if we are, many of the concepts of analytic therapies must be reconsidered. For example, how can a self-object be conceived in the context of virtual objects and digital assistants? Do they serve as extensions of the self in the same way Kohut envisioned self-objects? What meaning can emerge when a person loses a lot of information about themselves or themselves that is digitally stored (writings, photos)?

Can we elaborate on the concept of relational artifact? Are they relational objects that never let you down because of pre-programmed actions? Narcissistic fit without separation, exactness, and easy fulfillment (like sex dolls) can eliminate desire, which exists at the intersection of language and the body, and expand need (which relational objects can satisfy)? What about the depth and complexity inherent in these relationships?

AI exists and cannot be undone. Let us begin with a discussion of how we might benefit from AI. How can we position ourselves in relation to AI as something to think about and with, rather than something to think about, instead of?

We need to consider how technology will alter us, rather than simply blaming it for our issues. Considering the epistemological paradigm shift toward the machine mind model, I believe that contemplation of these realities through psychoanalysis and group analysis is crucial.

The client in our offices, a post-modern subject, lives in a liquid, fluid, changeable, quick, counterclockwise society. Group analytic theory and practice cannot ignore these qualities.

In my opinion, being cloistered is a fatal error because it could reveal a complete inability to deal with and reflect on changes, which would be a strange paradox for those who work with people and their circumstances. Analytical theory and practice are crucial for understanding human nature at a deep level.

Conclusion

Meat machines are not a trustworthy approach for humans. We believe that analytic theory, practice, and technique, and group analysis with a major evident role as a particular field that allows us to obtain knowledge and be interventive in societies, groups, and individuals, is a fundamental field that can help us understand these contemporary dystopic urges. A focus on the embodied and relational aspects of the mind is vital for preservation. This is a very different paradigm from an informational model of the mind (with or without a connection to a body). The informational model of the mind is not an answer to understanding human anxieties and the experience of being in the world. It is not at the same ontological level as a no/off button or an open/closed door. Therefore, we must be very attentive to the world, especially because irrational and unconscious processes occur rapidly, with a mask of clarity and rationality.

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I live in Lisbon with my beloved family: two beautiful daughters, a dog, and a cat. I have my own Clinic in Lisboa. That is very fulfilling because I can really be with my patients with total dedication. I have been working as a psychotherapist for 17 years. My graduations were in Philosophy and Clinical Psychology because I have always been motivated by questions related to human relations, emotions, and culture, studying groups, aesthetic, and political philosophy. Subjectivity, the self, consciousness, as well as human interaction with technology are also themes that I am passionate about. I am currently investigating the nature of the self and unconscious cognition from a Philosophy of Mind perspective. I am a group analyst and completed my training at the Portuguese Society of Groupanalysis and Group Analytical Psychotherapy