The Greek Trauma. Aspects of Totalitarianism in the Greek Social Unconscious

Wherever large groups exist, such as modern (and nowadays post-modern) states and nations in bourgeois Western societies, collectiveness and a community spirit are cultivated, together with respect for individual rights and liberal democracy (Smith, 1981, 1995; Ryan, 2012).  At the same time, however, collective mentality degenerates, entailing massiveness leading to incohesion and aggregation/massification (Hopper, 2003) and the development of morbid nationalism (Smith, 1981, 1995; Anderson, 1983). Social inequality and injustice develop, which potentially risk leading to totalitarian tendencies or regimes by parties of either the extreme right or extreme left. Considered within the limits of liberalism, collectivity seems to favour a very small segment of the population under capitalism or post-capitalism, i.e. the wealthy (Kitscelt, 1995; Ignazi, 1997; Sloterdijk, 2006; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008; Ansell & Samuels, 2010; Timmons, 2010; Haggard & Kaufman, 2012; Piketty, 2014; Mason, 2015; Menaldo, 2016; Ross, 2016). It is not accidental that nowadays, within the limits of post-totalitarian democracies, many extreme right-wing parties with authoritarian and totalitarian characteristics have emerged across all of Europe, including the states of the former Actually Existing Socialism, and even in the U.S.A. (Fenner & Weitz, 2004; Hainsworth, 2005), based on a mixture of varying elements, such as ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, populism, racism, and even Nazism, and have kept growing from the 1990s to the present (Hainsworth, 1992, 2005), as linked with the  authoritarian turn of neo-liberal capitalism (Klein, 2007; Bruff, 2016; Gonzales, 2016; Tansel, 2017) and the declining tendencies of liberal democracy (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Under these conditions, the ideology of populism becomes the poor people’s only weapon against the established ideology of the elites (Laclau, 1977). As the authoritarian and/or totalitarian ideology develops, the minds of the majority can be persuaded by politicians of the extreme right or left that authentic collectiveness is hidden deeply inside them and is promoted as the absolute truth representing the real people and leading to social equality. But, as the history of authoritarianism and totalitarianism has shown, this is an absolute lie. When put into practice on the political level, collective spirit of this kind eventually leads to the citizens’ absolute control by a powerful class and submission through the bureaucratic machinery of a police state and secret services, resulting in concentration camps, widespread persecution and the execution of dissidents who contest the regime and of certain minorities that are considered alien to the nation (Neumann, 1964; Havel & Keane, 1985). On the other hand, as long as both nations and history exist, i.e. humanity conceived as a large universal group, there is also historicism (Popper, 1957) together with utopianism and eschatology as expressing the ideal collectiveness under the absolute organization, control and direction of a privileged nation or social class and of its charismatic leader. This kind of destructive historicism was propagated in the 20th century and was linked to the establishment of totalitarian regimes by Nazism (Neumann, 1964) under Hitler’s government and Soviet Communism, especially under Stalin (Fitzpatrick, 2000; Bullock, 1993).

In the light of this brief introduction, we will now try to answer our main question. Could Greece, a state/nation which has several times flirted with totalitarianism in the 20th century, be potentially led to totalitarianism on the political level? Politically speaking, the reply to this question is undoubtedly No. Political thought and practice, as echoing analogous trends at the level of the social unconscious in Greece, fundamentally resist any form of political totalitarianism, owing to the centuries-long tradition of Greek democracy that was first initiated and established in the ancient city-state of Athens, and continues to live in the everyday behaviour and perceptions of the Greeks (Meier, 1990; Murray & Price, 1991; Finley, 1983, 1985). On the other hand, modern Greece, since it became an autonomous, albeit hybrid, state very late in Western history, and after many centuries under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, has not yet acquired a fully capitalist economy, much less imperialism (Mouzelis, 1978; Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2010), the harsh crises of which are known to be interwoven with the development of totalitarian regimes (Arendt, 1951; Poulantzas, 1974). This does not mean that the modern Greek state, throughout its history, has not seriously flirted with fascism and totalitarianism (Zink, 2000). Greek political history followed a process of expanding fascism (Poulantzas, 1974; Mavrogordatos, 1983; Fleischer, 2006) from the dictatorships of Pangalos (1925-1926) and later of Metaxas (1936-1941) to Greece’s third dictatorship (1967-1974). Furthermore, the Greek “deep state”, which was progressively developed  after the Greek Civil War (1946-1949),  especially during 1952-1967 and partially after  the political changeover of 1974 up to the end of the Cold War about 1989, was  based on relentless anti-communism in a way that touched the limits of a totalitarian regime, although within the limits of  traditional right-wing governments. In parallel, some totalitarian visions were cultivated as linked with Stalinism as expressed by some tendencies of the Greek Communist Party, which however remained marginal (Alivizatos, 1995; Kapetanyannis, 1995).  On the other hand, the Golden Dawn party and the National Political Union (EPEN) were formed in 1980 and 1984 respectively as was the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) that came into being in 2000, the Golden Dawn being only active and fast-growing to this day. EPEN was a fascist nationalistic party based on the ideology of the military junta of 1967-1974, LAOS belonged to the “far/radical right” or “radical right-wing populism” while Golden Dawn expresses the ideology of the “extreme right” (Hainsworth, 2008; Mudde, 2007; Georgiadou, 2013). Both LAOS and Golden Dawn constitute a paradoxical mixture of pre-bourgeois state and financial structures with the post-modern attitude that has prevailed in Greece owing to the growth of globalised capitalism and its crises, leading to a massive influx of migrants and the sharp rise of nationalism.

However, Greek democracy does not seem to be threatened so much by the development of new fascist, neo-fascist or semi-totalitarian parties, as by the totalitarian tendencies that are subjacent in the average mentality and behaviour at the level of the Greek social unconscious which, even in a stable parliamentary political system, is linked with the country’s profound national trauma. Some occult fascism is hidden in the average person’s paranoid, fearful, stereotyped, stiff and bureaucratic way of thinking and acting at the level of either the state or the citizens’ society, with totalitarian trends that are deeply rooted and permanent in nature, undermining from within the ability of Greek society to be organized as an effective democratic state based on promoting the common good and social well-being. As in the Sisyphus drama, the Greek national trauma has been associated with the Greek people for millennia, based primarily on the abrupt transition from the ancient Greek state and culture, pre-eminent worldwide, from the empire of Alexander the Great and the Byzantine Empire to the modern Greek state with its restricted geographical limits and its underdeveloped socio-political, financial and cultural life, based largely on pre-industrial premises. As a result, this state has been unable to follow the economic and cultural evolution of the West as it has evolved in modern times (Pollis, 1965, 1977; Tsoukalas, 1968; Mouzelis, 1978; Clogg, 1992), which led to the emergence of unhealthy behaviours and practices in its collective life and in the social unconscious. The latter has in turn hindered the evolution of the state, leading the economic, socio-political and cultural development of Greece through an endless vicious circle characterized by low urbanization and pre-capitalistic industrialization on the economic level, with continuous splitting processes and polarized competition in a two-part system in which the political parties were for a long time dependent on the interests of the Great Powers of the West (Tsoukalas, 1968; Pollis, 1977; Mouzelis, 1978; 1986; Pappas & Assimakopoulou, 2012). This is “a patronage democracy” (Chandra, 2009), a democratic political system based on “bureaucratic clientelism” (Lyrintzis, 1984) and statism (Pappas & Assimakopoulou, 2012), which goes hand in hand with the atrophied intellectual development of the intelligentsia and low production of ideology (Legg, 1969; Lemarchand & Legg, 1972; Pollis, 1977; Kosmopoulos, 1975).

Greece is a unique phenomenon, and at the same time a deviant “clinical” case. From the manner in which state power is exercised to the way in which relationships are cultivated at the base of the citizens’ society, from the constitution of the Greek State (1830) to the present time, profound psychotic (schizophrenic) symptoms as well as symptoms of autism and borderline personality disorder, and even character disturbances, appear in the behaviour of Greeks. In terms of Klein, this is due to a morbid regression of the Greek people to the paranoid-schizoid position that engenders persecution anxiety, which they try to avoid by making excessive use of archaic defences such as splitting, projection, projective identification, denial, triumph and devaluation, and primitive destructive idealisation, leading to a series of malignant mirroring processes, lack of insight and resonances mainly based on strong feelings of envy among citizens (Klein, 1940, 1946, 1957). In Freudian terms, the fundamental cause of this Greek pathology can be attributed to the excessive constriction and virtual shattering that the Greek superego, the source of social and moral values on the Oedipal level (Freud, 1923), has suffered nationally in the course of its history as a result of the above traumatic transitions. Consequently, individuals or groups, using overcompensation, develop both a severe personal and national superego and an inflated, weak superego leading to total relaxation, indifference and a low level of moral awareness, in other words, a pseudo-superego based on what Winnicott (1965) has called a “false self”, a vulnerable self-image. It is because of the strong repression of this double-bind superego that the average modern Greek culture is imbued with features similar to those of schizophrenia, which could euphemistically be called “hellenophreneia”. Due to these alterations of the Greek superego, symbolic law, the hallmark of paternity in the sense of the Name-of-the-Father, which at the same time constitutes a major safeguard against the development of psychotic situations (Lacan, 1994, 1998; Koukis, 2016), frequently appears atrophied in the Greek culture, is altogether absent or called upon to be applied selectively depending on the citizens’ involvement in the patronage system. A deep split is thus established between the individual and the collective spirit, which eventually leads to indifference to any form of collectivity or to any institutional feature based on the common good and also to an unhealthy fixation on individualism, encysted narcissism, egocentrism,  authoritarianism  and totalitarianism on the behavioural level. Under these conditions, people are forced to live in an established environment of profound and continuous fear, suspicion and mutual hatred, obedience, dependence on and deference to established authority, powerlessness, political and attitudinal amoralism and fatalism (Pollis, 1977) as people do under totalitarian regimes (Havel & Keane, 1985), even when they are living in a democratic context on the political level. This fact, in conjunction with the narcissistic mass culture of the post-modern world (Jameson, 1990; Harvey, 1991), risks leading to what could be called “the totalitarianism of the superego” which is mixed with “superego indifference” on the cultural and socio- political level as mainly based on the prevalence of many forms of an exuberant narcissism and indifference to the concept of the social good.

Could this amalgam of moral indifference and behavioural totalitarianism lead to institutionalized forms of political behaviours and the establishment of authoritarian regimes that would have much more appeal to the Greek people in the future than the appeal of the current extreme or radical right-wing parties? At first sight one could say that the answer to this question is No. First and foremost, there is no reciprocal relationship between the micro-history of habits (habitus) (Bourdieu, 1977) and the macro-history of politics. On the level of everyday behaviour, totalitarian tendencies act mainly in a psychological way and release great loads of authoritarian energy, which seems to preclude the investment of these tendencies in any representative of political authoritarianism, while at the same functioning as a protective shield against it. For this reason, totalitarian ideologies cannot easily find a way of insinuating themselves into behavioural totalitarianism and influencing it to attract voters. Also, and most important, deep in the Greek social unconscious, there exists a total of values, the central axis of which is the profile of human behaviour based on politeness, social cheerfulness, well-being and humour (the stance of the “good hearted”) and above all “φιλότιμο”, i.e. “self-esteem” (Pollis, 1977) or “sense of honor”. These values could be regarded as being in accordance with the parasitic development of the urban economy in Greece, which produces ideology (or, more precisely, “shreds of ideologies”) mixed with totalitarian behavioural trends by legitimizing the Greek political and economic system. However, if we exclude their ideological content, these values contain such great significance that their productive usage could open the way to the relaxation of the superego and, by extension, to ever greater progress and creation. In Foulkes’ (1990) terms, it could be said that the existence of the above values argues in favour of the fact that Greek – even though it is characterized by an unhealthily developed dynamic matrix that is mainly based on psychotic defences – nevertheless appears to have a very strong foundation matrix based on highlighting the value of life in community. If we take into account that the concept of community (koinonia) has always been the cornerstone of the Greek culture, from the age of the ancient city-state to that of the Byzantine Empire, and from there to the present (de Maré, Piper, & Thompson, 1991), we can easily conclude that the modern Greek culture has brought together skilfully the ancient Greek spirit with the Byzantine one. It is then assumed that the spirit of community considerably detoxifies the totalitarian trends that are inherent in the Greek social unconscious.

Despite this, a bizarre collectiveness is ultimately constituted in the Greek social unconscious which is part of the Greek particularity and based, in Bion’s terms (1970),  on the mixture with a good enough symbiosis due to community spirit and collaboration, as well as a bad/parasitic symbiosis reflecting the severity and indifference in relations between the state and the citizens and among the citizens themselves, a fact that eliminates social and political cohesion by considering the other as an enemy and a persecuting figure. This is pseudo-collectiveness in the sense that the Greek culture, although it is profoundly individualistic, narcissistic and authoritarian, is self-presented as a highly social and collective culture based on a common pre-urban perspective. When Greek people lie, in the sense of presenting themselves as a prototype of sociality and humanity, they are lying first and foremost to themselves, a fact somewhat reminiscent of the ways in which people of the Eastern bloc used to lie under the communist regimes, by pretending that they truly supported the values imposed by these regimes, thus concealing the truth (Havel & Keane, 1985). This sidestepping of the truth, and losing themselves in the realm of lies, constitutes true authoritarianism and totalitarianism on the psychological/dispositional, cultural and, by extension, socio-political level.

For the moment, Greece is protected against any possible extension of this peculiar totalitarianism into the domain of state policies and regimes due to the moral “anarchy” which is an integral part of the habits and behaviour of its population. It is hypothesized that people like the Greeks, who are characterized by an atrophied sense of the common good by circumventing it, are constantly suspicious of any concept of absolute collectiveness linked with forms of nationalism and historicism leading to totalitarianism, a fact that functions as a safeguard against the latter. However, nobody can guarantee that the Greek culture could not find another, more dangerous direction by favouring and fostering extreme right- or left-wing regimes thereby paving the way for political totalitarianism in the future. On the other hand, as said, latent authoritarian and potentially totalitarian tendencies are not only a characteristic of the Greek social unconscious but are also deeply linked with the crises of capitalism and nowadays post-capitalism as currently expressing neo-liberalism all across the Western world. Greece is strongly protected against the totalitarianism hidden in the evolution of capitalism, thanks to its pre-modern pre-bourgeois socio-political and economic structures and values as mixed with capitalistic and post-capitalistic elements. If the totalitarian tendencies that are encapsulated in the Greek social unconscious could be effectively elaborated in the future, Greece might perhaps become a prototype society based on the ideal harmonization of pre-modern, modern, and post-modern elements on the socio-political, economic and national level.

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Anastassios Koukis
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